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KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND REVELATION:
A REPLY TO PATRICK LEE
Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr.

In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Patrick Lee argues that religious
belief in the fact of revelation, identified as the fact that God reveals, is based
neither on knowledge nor on belief in testimony. He develops an alternative
account of religious belief as Mreasonable conviction." In response, I argue
that his arguments on the first point fail, and I also raise objections to his
alternative account. I show that the rationality of religious belief can be based
on knowledge in a way which Lee overlooks, and that it is analogous to the
rationality of non-religious belief in an important way which Lee is forced
to give up.
In "Reasons and Religious Belief,"1 Patrick Lee argues that the rationality of
religious belief is owing neither to know ledge nor to belief on testimony,
either human or divine, but to "reasonable conviction." In this "Reply" I show
first that his arguments against basing religious belief on knowledge or on
divine testimony fail. Then I raise some objections against his alternative
account of religious belief as "reasonable conviction." My own view throughout is that the rationality of religious belief can be based on knowledge, on
the direct knowledge of God, a possibility which Lee does not explore and
which his arguments do not rule out. This view has the advantage of restricting the object of religious belief to what God says-the content of the revelation, and it thus also preserves an important analogy between the rationality
of religious and non-religious belief which Lee is forced to give up. I also
think this view is closer to the Biblical view of religious belief.
In his abstract Lee identifies the object of religious belief as both "that God
has revealed and that what he has revealed is true. "2 It becomes clear in his
discussion, however, that he takes mainly the first of these, viz., "that God
has revealed" as the critical object of religious belief. That is "the fact of
revelation" which is "the principal thing" which believers accept and nonbelievers do not. "Before one accepts p, it seems one must first accept that
God has asserted p-the fact of revelation."3 How important it is to keep
these two things distinct-that God reveals and what he reveals-will soon
be evident.
Lee begins with an example of the rationality of non-religious belief. He
tells how he himself believes his colleague, Professor Jones, one Friday
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afternoon when Jones tells him that one of his students named Smith stopped
by that morning to see him when he was not in. The example is one of belief,
says Lee, because he cannot know the proposition about Smith, either by
perception or by inference from any evidence Smith left of his having been
there; nor, of course, is it self-evident. Furthermore, it is an example of
rational belief because it has a basis: the trustworthiness of Jones.
Commenting on his example, Lee says "it appears that I have a choice. I
could believe Jones or not. "4 But this is not always the case. We do not always
deliberate over what we are told by those whom we know, and know to be
trustworthy; and I assume that, in his example, Lee knows Jones and that he
is trustworthy. Let us overlook that point, however. For Lee is right that
sometimes, at least, we must deliberate over whether to believe someone,
even a friend whom we know to be reliable; for example, he may tell us
something which conflicts with one of our other beliefs. On some occasions,
certainly, we must also deliberate over whether to believe a stranger. So
believing (or disbelieving) a fellow human being may involve choice.
Still-and this is a critical point-even then (perhaps especially then) rational belief is entirely compatible with knowledge, both knowing that someone says something for us to believe and knowing that person, in particular,
knowing that he is trustworthy. Notice that the non-religious belief situation
has the same two parts as the situation of religious belief: that someone says
something and what someone says. Notice also that the object of belief is the
second part: what someone says. Notice finally that the rationality of believing this object actually depends upon knowing the first part (that someone
says something) plus, of course, who it is and that the person is trustworthy.
But, says Lee, there is an "important disanalogy" between religious and
non-religious belief. Indeed, "with religious belief the situation is reversed."
What is "obvious" (clearly known) in human testimony is "that the witness
says p." What is not always obvious is that the witness is "veracious in saying
it."5 By contrast, says Lee, what is obvious (clearly known) for divine revelation is only the conditional statement: "that if God asserts p, then p must
be true." The fact that God asserts p is in doubt: "What some doubt, and what
seems to require a choice to accept, is whether God does in fact assert p.
Before one accepts p, it seems one must first accept that God has asserted
p-the fact of revelation."6 What is obvious in non-religious belief (Lee
knows that Jones is the speaker) is not obvious in the case of religious belief
("some doubt... whether God has asserted p-the fact of revelation").
At this point Lee sees a problem. And no wonder, for Lee has removed the
very familiar basis for a belief's being rational in the case of human testimony
from the case of divine revelation, viz., knowledge of the speaker (God)
himself. This is the result of Lee's having made the first fact in the situation
(that God speaks) the object of belief (actually, doubt) instead of the second
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(what God says). But he does not think this first fact can be known. Not that
nothing can be known. What can be known is that if God speaks, what he
says is true; but such knowledge is worthless unless we know first that God
speaks. Can we know that? Can we know that in fact God has given a
revelation? Not by any demonstrative proof, says Lee; "the argument against
this is conclusive. "7 On this point I agree.
Lee also offers the following argument against the possibility of knowing
the fact of revelation:
If one has knowledge of the fact of revelation then, it seems, one's acceptance
of the revealed truths is not faith but knowledge. If one has knowledge that,
a) God is truthful (or, more modestly, that if God asserts p then p is true),
and b) God has asserted p, then the conclusion that p is true is an instance
of knowledge, not belief.8

The argument assumes that just because someone can rightly infer the truth
of a proposition from something known, the proposition cannot be an object
of that person's belief But I think the assumption is false. People can even
doubt such propositions. As we just saw, even though Lee might infer from
Jones' trustworthiness that what Jones says is true, Lee could doubt what
Jones tells him if what Jones said was in conflict with something else Lee
believes.
The same is true for religious belief. Consider the case of Abraham. On
several occasions Abraham disbelieved God's promises to him that he and
Sarah would have a son and that his descendants would inhabit the land of
Canaan (Gen. 15:8; 17: 17-18). Did Abraham doubt God because he did not
know it was God who made these promises? Or because he failed to make
the inference that if God says p, p is true? Nothing in the story suggests an
explanation of his doubt along these lines. The story suggests instead that
Abraham had trouble believing what God said even though he knew it was
God who said it. And his trouble came from the fact that God's word went
against other beliefs Abraham held, beliefs based on his own reason and
experience. So Abraham had to make a choice between what God said and
what he inferred from his own (non-religious) experience, and on these occasions he preferred the latter. Unbelief may just be doubting the veracity of
God. That is why, in this case, religious unbelief is irrational, for what God
says cannot be false while what we think on the basis of "our own reason
and experience" can.
Of course, Abraham also chose on some other occasions to believe God.
Most notable is the occasion when God commands him to sacrifice Isaac
(Gen. 22), for then God's command went against not only his conscience but
even God's own earlier promises. The all-important point, however, is that
Abraham's faith (as well as his doubt) is entirely consistent with his knowing
God and that God said what he did say-the fact of revelation. Thus
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Abraham's situation is altogether analogous on that point with the non-religious situation of Lee's believing Jones who tells him about Smith. All we
need is a theory of how Abraham knew it was God speaking to him. One
theory that seems to fit is that Abraham knew the fact of revelation by simply
experiencing it. Lee does not explore that possibility.
In fact, on the Biblical view (as I understand it), the correct human analogy
for religious belief is not the relationship between philosophical colleagues
(God is not our colleague), but the relationship between a child and its
parents. The child's problem is not that he does not know his parents, that
they are trustworthy, and what they require, but that the child sometimes just
chooses not to listen to what they say. That is because the child can be
obstinate and want to follow "his own ideas" about what to believe and how
to behave. So, too, according to the Bible, we are God's children, but children
who often resist his authority over our lives because of our sin. When by his
grace we choose to believe what he says instead of the way things look to
us, based on "our own reason and experience," this is entirely consistent with
our knowing the fact of revelation, that God tells us what he does tell us.
Indeed, that knowledge is the basis of the rationality of our belief. On this
view of religious belief, therefore, Lee's problem about knowledge of "the
fact of revelation," that it obviates belief, disappears. For the object of religious belief is not the fact of revelation-that God reveals but the content of
revelation-what God says.
Lee also argues against the possibility of accepting the fact of revelation
on the basis of testimony, human or divine. Against accepting the fact of
revelation on divine testimony, he says:
But to accept the fact that God is giving testimony on the basis of God's
testimony is obviously not rational. If one is asked, "Why do you believe
so-and-so," and one replies, "Because so-and-so himself said he is trustworthy," the reply could scarcely be taken seriously.9

But why isn't it rational to accept someone's testimony to his own trustworthiness? Suppose a man is on the witness stand, and responds at one
point to a persistent cross-examination by saying, "Look, I have told you
the truth, I'm an honest man." One of the jurors, when later asked by
another juror why he believed the witness's testimony, could sensibly
reply, "He also said he was an honest man, and I believe him." Again, it
is part of a person's last will and testament that he testifies to his "being
of sound mind and memory," which would be pointless unless he expected
others to believe it. Again, when the Pharisees complained that Jesus bore
witness to himself, Jesus did not deny it, but reaffirmed it (John 8:14-18),
which implies he meant it to be taken seriously. The author of 3 John
comes close to vouching for himself when he writes "and you know my
testimony is true" (3 John 12). "And he who sat on the throne said ... " to
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the author of the Apocalypse, "Write this, for these words are trustworthy
and true" (Rev. 21: 5). So there is nothing necessarily odd about testifying
to the truth of one's own words, and expecting to be taken seriously when
one does.
Why, therefore, isn't it possible for human beings to accept the fact that
God gives testimony, either about himself and his faithfulness or about other
things, on the basis of God's being his own witness? That is indeed what the
Bible represents Noah, Abraham, Moses and David doing when they accepted
the covenant which God established with them (Gen. 9; 17; Ex. 24; Ps. 89).
The Bible portrays anyone who believes God (not just the prophets) as accepting God's covenant, God's own testimony to human beings about himself, his promises and his faithfulness (Jer. 31; Heb. 8-9). Believing God's
testimony about himself and his faithfulness to his covenant may be seen as
the heart of biblical religion. So Lee's argument against accepting the fact
of revelation on the basis of divine testimony also fails. In fact, accepting the
fact of revelation just because it is God himself who testifies to himself in
the Bible will also account very well for the certainty of religious faith, which
Lee rightly says is essential to it.
Lee argues next that religious faith cannot be based on human testimony:
"The reason is this. For belief to be rational it must ultimately be traced back
to someone's knowledge of the matter. Now, first, it is not at all clear that
any human persons have or had knowledge that God has in fact given a
revelation."lo Earlier we saw Lee argue against this possibility. But if knowing that God has given a revelation is not possible, then the Biblical reports
that the prophets and apostles knew the fact of revelation are mistaken.
No wonder, then, that Lee wavers in his view that no one can know God
has given a revelation when he goes on to say:
... the only human beings [prophets and apostles] who could plausibly be said
to know that God has given a revelation are quite far removed from us in
time. Therefore, if human testimony were the basis of one's certainty about
the fact of revelation (setting aside the derivative case of children and simple
people) then that certainty could not be as firm or strong, reasonably, as
religious believers claim that it is or should be. I!

He wavers in his view because it seems to conflict with his description of
what he thinks it might mean when "Christians claim that they believe God
himself." He wants to understand this claim on the analogy of his example
of believing Professor Jones after all:
Christians claim that God has spoken through the words and deeds of prophets and of his Son, and that these words and deeds are handed down to us by
the Church .... It is like the example of believing Prof. Jones. However, what
God has done and spoken is handed down to us by messengers and mediators.
For this reason it is more like believing Jones but hearing what he has said
through a messenger, say, his secretary (or the secretarial pOOI).12
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But then, of course, Lee cannot connect the religious belief of Christians
today with divine revelation except by the tradition of human testimony, and
this tradition will not account for the certainty of religious belief. Hence his
argument against basing religious belief that God has revealed himself on
human testimony.
Lee's problem here seems to be something like this. If only the prophets
and apostles knew the fact of revelation, we today can only believe that fact
on their testimony (which has been handed down by the Church). If we can
only believe that fact on such human testimony, we cannot account for the
certainty of religious faith. Therefore, our religious faith must arise in some
other way. So far so good. But if our religious faith arises in some other way,
the religious faith of the prophets and apostles must have arisen in some other
way also, since no one (on his earlier argument) can know the fact of revelation. With that reasoning, as I have said, I disagree. Let me now discuss
Lee's other way.
That other way is "reasonable conviction," which Lee defines as "accepting
with certainty a proposition for the sake of a good which the belief of that
proposition, together with its truth, if it turns out to be true, will help or
enable one to realize. "13 Lee illustrates such belief with an example adapted
from William James:
Suppose a man is mountain climbing, and has climbed to a dangerous spot
from which he can escape only by jumping across a wide chasm. The evidence just on its own indicates that it is probable, but only probable, that he
will make the jump (I am changing James's example slightly, for my purposes). But if he believes with certainty he can make it then his chances are
greatly increased. It seems to me that it would not be wrong for him to try
to induce in himself the belief that he will make the jump. To choose to
believe this, or to choose to try to believe it, does not seem irrational. Such
an act does not seem to violate one's duty to seek truth and avoid error. (If
one's success in jumping were wildly improbable, then it might violate one's
moral duty in regard to truth; but on our supposition it is probable that he
will succeed.)14

This analysis of the rationality of belief combines a calculation of what is
probable with a deep desire to attain a great good.
Even the calculation of what is probable, of course, is a kind of knowledge.
This shows, if nothing else, how very difficult it is to exclude knowledge
from the basis of rational belief. The point of religious belief as "reasonable
conviction," however, is that it goes beyond the evidence in a way that
evidentialists like Clifford, Russell and Flew regard as irrational. What saves
its rationality in spite of this for Lee are two things: the respect for truth (the
mountain climber believes only if the evidence is probable that he will make
the jump) and the desire for a great good (the climber saves his life if indeed
he does make the jump).
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My objections to Lee's account are two. First, he believes that religious
belief as "reasonable conviction" is protected from the evidentialist objection
because it finds a way of legitimizing going beyond the evidence in the
prospect of achieving some good. But even granting the legitimacy of thus
going beyond the evidence, the evidentialist objection will still have its foot
in the door. For notice that for his belief to be rational, the climber must first
determine that his making the jump is probable on the evidence he has before
him; thus he must still be an evidentialist. Likewise, someone who considers
whether to believe the fact of revelation will have to investigate whether the
fact of revelation is probable on the evidence. But that question is very much
in dispute among those who have considered it. Bertrand Russell can still
say, when, after dying, he is asked by God why he didn't believe, "Not enough
evidence, God! Not enough evidence! Not enough evidence, that is, on which
it was even probable, when I was on earth, that you revealed yourself to
earthlings, that the fact of revelation was true." So I don't believe Lee answers the evidentialist objection after all, as he thinks he does.
The second objection is that religious belief does not seem to be based on
desiring some great good. Again, the case of Abraham is relevant. It does not
seem that Abraham chose to believe that God spoke to him because he still
wanted children by Sarah in their advanced age, as the mountain climber
believes he can make the jump because he desperately wants to save his life.
To be sure, one way of describing the great good which God offers human
beings is, in Lee's words, membership in "a community of divine and human
persons (called 'the Kingdom')." But do unbelievers become believers because they desperately desire such a good and have calculated the probability
that such a community is one of the things God has revealed? I'm not convinced. It does not seem like the faith of Abraham, by which Abraham trusted
God and not his own reasonings and desires, and which God "reckoned to
him for righteousness" (Gen. 15: 6). There may well be a place for belief as
"reasonable conviction" in human affairs, but I don't see that it offers reliable
clues to the nature of religious belief or its rationality.
I have cited the case of Abraham because St. Paul calls him the "father of
all who believe" (Rom. 4: 11). Abraham's faith might therefore be a better
paradigm for Christian faith than William James' mountain climber. Christians must believe what God reveals about many things (e.g., the creation of
the world, the incarnation of his son in Jesus Christ, or that Jesus is coming
again) precisely because they cannot know them, either directly by experience
or indirectly by proof. As Paul says elsewhere, such things "no eye has seen,
nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived" (1 Cor. 2: 9). Still, Paul goes
on here to say:
Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from
God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed upon us by God. And we
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impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit,
interpreting spiritual truths to those who possess the Spirit. (l Cor. 2: 12-13)
To be "taught by the Spirit," why isn't that to hear God speak? And to hear
God speak, why isn't that knowing God, and more precisely, knowing the fact
of revelation itself, i.e., knowing that God reveals what the believer hears?
In this way, then, religious faith, believing what God says, is rational because
it is based on the knowledge of God and that he reveals himself.
As for the question whether only the prophets and apostles can plausibly
be said to know that God reveals, I think Kierkegaard was correct when,
pondering the story of Abraham, he said that "he saw no reason why the same
thing might not have taken place on a barren heath in Denmark."15.16
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